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ABSTRACT
The article discusses the federalist concepts of the Bulgarian economist Boncho Boev, formulated 
during the Bulgarian-Serbian rapprochement in 1904. The creation of a South-Slavic State would 
take place through the economic integration of Serbia and Bulgaria, which, by improving their 
economic position, would simultaneously strengthen their political situation and join Macedonia. 
Boev’s views are presented on the basis of speeches given during the Student Balkan Congress in 
Sofia on 6–8 March (22–24 February old style) 1904, and subsequently published in the Journal 
of the Bulgarian Economic Society as “Посещението на Сръбски крал и сръбско-българското 
сближение” [The Visit of the King of Serbia and the Serbian-Bulgarian Rapprochement] and 
“Балканската федерация като идеал на сръбско-българската младеж” [The Balkan Federation 
as the Ideal of the Bulgarian-Serb Youth].
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INTRODUCTION
The Bulgarian-Serbian relations in the second half of the 19th and early 20th Cen-
tury were not friendly in many aspects, among others in the field of politics. While 
in the 1860s there had been projects of rapprochement between these two Slavic na-
tions, such as the Bulgarian Leagues in Belgrade or the Yugoslav Tsardom, in later 
years more and more areas of conflict appeared. Historians take the year 1878 and 
the Treaty of Berlin as the symbolic date of the end of the romantic period in the rela-
1  This paper is a part of an OPUS 13 project, funded by the National Science Centre in Cracow, 
called “Between two congresses in Prague: relations among the Slavs in Central and South-East Europe 
in 1848–1908” (2017/25/B/HS3/00240).
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tions among the Balkan nations. The establishment of the Bulgarian state, initially 
within borders that included lands which the Serbs regarded as ethnically Serbian, 
started the growing conflict. The disagreement about spheres of influence in and the 
character of Macedonia, which found itself within the borders of the collapsing Ot-
toman Empire, meant that the closely connected nations could not find a common 
ground. However, even at that time there were some persons who went against the 
mutual animosity and searched for areas in which agreement could be found. It was 
in this spirit that in 1904 the Bulgarian economist Boncho Boev proposed a project of 
Bulgarian-Serbian unification, expanding on its economic aspects in response to the 
expectations of the liberal circles in South Slavic states.2
The Balkan unionism in the 19th Century was analyzed not only by the Balkan 
researchers as Leften Stavros Stavrianos,3 Ivan Ormandzhiev,4 Tsetan Stoyanov,5 or 
Milcho Lalkov6 but also historians from Central Europe as Elżbieta Znamierowska-
Rakk,7 Irena Stawowy-Kawka8 or Árpád Hornyák.9 Polish interests in this problem 
should not come as a surprise—one of the leading figure of the Polish diaspora in 
the 19th c. Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski was the author of the federal concept of 
the Balkan nations.10 There were more works about the Yugoslavism, however, the 
Bulgarian issues were in a margin of these concepts.11 It is important that the most 
important works are quite old—they were written in the first half of the 20th Century.
2  E. Znamierowska-Rakk, “Z dziejów bałkańskich koncepcji federacyjnych (od schyłku XVIII 
w. do końca I wojny światowej),” Studia z Dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej 2000, vol. 35, 
p. 15.
3  L.S. Stavrianos, Balkan Federation: A History of the Movement toward Balkan Unity in Modern 
Times, Northampton 1944.
4  И. Орманджиев, Федерация на балканските народи. Идеи и пречки, София 1947.
5  Ц. Стоянов, Федеративната идея в българо-сръбските отношения, София 1919.
6  М. Лалков, От надежда към Разочерование, идеята за федерация в балканския югоизток, 
София 1994.
7  E. Znamierowska-Rakk, “Z dziejów bałkańskich koncepcji federacyjnych (od schyłku 
XVIII w. do końca I wojny światowej),” pp. 5–23.
8  I. Stawowy-Kawka, “Miejsce Macedonii w koncepcjach federacji bałkańskiej” [in:] Ku 
zjednoczonej Europie. Studia nad Europą Środkową i Południowo-Wschodnią w XIX i XX wieku, eds. 
I. Stawowy-Kawka, W. Rojek, Kraków 1997, pp. 83–98.
9  Á. Hornyák, “The Balkan Federation 1866–1948,” Bulgarian Historical Review 2007, vol. 35, 
no. 1–2, pp. 217–232.
10  The most valuble works about the Czartoryski’s federal conceptions were written by Jerzy 
Skowronek (Sprzymierzeńcy narodów bałkańskich, Warszawa 1983), Antoni Cetnarowicz (“Wkład 
Polaków w kształtowaniu się idei jedności wśród Słowian południowych,” Studia Polono-Danubiana 
et Balcanica 1995, vol. 7, pp. 33–44), and Piotr Żurek (Czarnogórcy i Serbowie w rosyjskiej polityce 
księcia Adama Jerzego Czartoryskiego (1802–1806), Kraków 2009).
11  В. Енчев, “Югославската идея сред южните славяни през ХІХ и ХХ век,” Актуални 
проблеми, аспекти и перспективи на международните отношения 2010, т. 2, pp. 318–333; See 
also: М. Екмечић, Стварање Југославије 1790–1918, Београд 1989; Ф. Шишић, Југословенска 
мисао. Историја идеје југословенског народног уједињења и ослобођења од 1790–1918, Београд 
1937; A. Giza, Idea jugoslawizmu w latach 1800–1918, Szczecin 1992.
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BONCHO BOEV
In the book България XX век: Алманах (Bulgaria 20th Century: Almanac), edited 
by Filip Panayotov, Boncho Nenkov Boev is described as “a typical representative of 
the first post-revival generation of the Bulgarian intellectual and economic elite”.12 
He was born in 1859 in the town of Kotel, where he received his primary education, 
which he continued in the renowned Aprilov National High School in Gabrovo. He 
then left for Russia and attended the seminary in Odessa. He gave up the career of an 
Orthodox priest and in 1877 he started a course in law at the University of Moscow, 
during which he also trained in Germany. After returning to Bulgaria in 1885, he was 
employed as a clerk in the Ministry of Finance, where he was later promoted to the 
head of the Direct Tax Department. In the second half of the 1880s and the first half 
of the 1890s he was responsible for important reforms, such as introducing a system 
of tax control and the end of collecting taxes in kind. In 1894–1906, Boev taught 
finance and statistics in the Higher School in Sofia (present day University of Sofia), 
and during this time he joined the Bulgarian Literary Society (present-day Bulgarian 
Academy of Sciences) and established the Bulgarian Economic Society, of which 
he was the chairman in 1901–1906. In 1901 he started to publish the society’s press 
organ—Journal of the Bulgarian Economic Society, of which he was the editor-in-
chief. The pinnacle of Boev’s career was the position of the Governor of the Bulgar-
ian National Bank in 1906–1908.
In 1908 he finished his career in the public sector and went on to pursue trade and 
private banking. First, he became involved in developing the cement industry, then 
he was a board member of Girdap—the first privately owned Bulgarian bank, the 
third largest one in the country prior to 1912 (after the Bulgarian Commercial Bank 
and the Bulgarian Credit Bank). During WWI Girdap, as well as Boev, who occupied 
important positions in the bank, cooperated closely with the government. After the 
war, as a result of reckoning with politicians responsible for war losses, he was sen-
tenced to prison, along with other members of the Girdap board. Boev was arrested 
for eight months, but quickly was acquitted. After his release, he worked on paying 
off the bank’s debts, as a result of which he lost most of his estate and got into serious 
debt, which continued to be paid off by his family after his death. Boncho Boev died 
in 1934 in Sofia.13
12  България 20 век. Алманах, съст. Ф. Панайотов, София 1999, p. 236.
13  Р. Аврамов, Комуналният капитализъм. Из българското стопанско минало, т. 2, София 
2007, pp. 508–525; Голяма енциклопедия България, т. 1: А–Бъл, ред. В. Гюзелев, София 2011, 
p. 310.
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BULGARIAN-SERBIAN RAPPROCHEMENT IN 1904
The first years of the 20th Century were rife with events which led to a profound 
change in the distribution of forces in the Balkans. The collapse of the Ilinden-Pre-
obrazhenie Uprising in Macedonia and Thrace in 1903 led to doubts about the suc-
cess of revolutionary actions in the Balkans and shifted the centre of gravity to the 
vision of calming down the provinces by means of reforms introduced under the 
supervision of the European Great Powers. These events forced Bulgaria, undoubt-
edly helpless in the face of the dynamically changing situation, to redefine its Balkan 
policy. At the same time, the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 clearly 
revealed the Russian Tsar’s focus on Asian and Far-Eastern matters and withdrawal 
from South-Eastern Europe. Austria-Hungary, devising visions of expansion towards 
Thessaloniki, tried to use this void to its advantage. The decision-makers in Vienna 
and Budapest were also forced to rethink the guidelines of their Balkan policy—in 
Serbia, so far economically and politically dependent, the May Coup took place in 
1903. The pro-Habsburg House of Obrenović lost power, and Peter I Karađorđević 
and the new government were not so easy to control. Serbia ruled by the grandson 
of Black George, who took over power as a result of a bloody coup d’état, initially 
found itself isolated.
In these circumstances new concepts emerged of cooperation between South 
Slavic countries: Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro, under the patronage of Russia 
and against the interests of Austria-Hungary. The initiator of rapprochement talks 
was Bulgaria, which first approached Montenegro on this matter. To this end, Dimitar 
Rizov, a politician close to the Bulgarian Prince Ferdinand I Coburg, who had gained 
political experience as a trade agent in Skopje (1897–1899), was sent to Cetinje. Like 
the Montenegrin Prince Nicholas, Rizov believed the Obrenović dynasty to be the 
main obstacle to the rapprochement of “fraternal nations, derived from one tribe”.14 
They were wrong—it was the Macedonian issue that turned out to be the major point 
of contention. Montenegro was willing to cooperate with Bulgaria only on condition 
that Macedonia would be divided into spheres of influence. Meanwhile, the Bulgar-
ians refused to change the position that the alliance should be based on supporting re-
forms which in time would lead to the autonomy of Macedonia. Neither side wanted 
to budge and the government in Sofia gave up cooperation with Cetinje at this stage, 
consoling itself that Serbia would be the key partner in the project, as a neighbour 
with much greater military and economic potential.15
14  С. Радоева, Димитър Ризов – от Битоля до Берлин (1862–1918), София 2014, pp. 124–128.
15  “Доклад от българския дипломатически агент в Цетине Спас Константинович до министър-
председателя и министър на външните работи Рачо Петров, Цетине 14.05.1903” [in:] Отношенията 
между България и Черна гора 1878–1913 г. Сборник с документи, съст. М. Тодоракова, 
М. Каписода, София 2015, p. 213; “Шифрована телеграма от българския дипломатически агент 
в Цетине Андрей Тошев до княз Фердинанд I, Цетине 19.10.1905” [in:] Отношенията между 
България и Черна гора, pp. 257–260.
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The government in Belgrade, which counted on ending its international isolation 
after the May Coup, sought an agreement with Bulgaria, which was one of the few 
European countries that did not criticise the changes that followed the bloody over-
throw of the House of Obrenović. The government in Sofia delegated the Bulgarian 
military attaché Hristo Hesapchiev as the negotiator, who in February 1904 was ap-
pointed the diplomatic agent in Belgrade. With time, he was joined by Rizov, who 
was valuable due to having close relations with the leaders of the Serbian government 
camp: the head of the People’s Radical Party, Nikola Pašić, and the speaker of the 
Serbian National Assembly, Aca Stanojević. The Bulgarians spoke about a strictly 
defensive alliance, based on not allowing Austria-Hungary (treated by Belgrade as 
the main enemy of the South Slavs) to occupy Macedonia, supporting a programme 
of reforms in the region, and opening Bulgarian ports to Serbian goods. In short: 
Bulgaria was to treat the Habsburg Monarchy as an enemy, and Serbia was to accept 
the Bulgarian policy with regard to Macedonia.16
Serbia held a similar position to Montenegro in terms of solving Macedonian is-
sues and was not prepared to abandon it easily. Pašić pushed for dividing spheres of 
influence on the territory of Turkey-in-Europe among three South Slavic countries. 
Kosovo and the Sanjak of Skopje (an area called by Serbs as “Old Serbia”) were 
to become the sphere of Serbian influence, the rest of Macedonia and Adrianople 
Thrace—of Bulgarian one, and the Albanian territories—of Montenegrin one. The 
Serbs emphasised that the Vilayet of Kosovo should be incorporated into their state as 
compensation for the annexation of Eastern Rumelia by Bulgaria in 1885. The gov-
ernment in Belgrade also suggested introducing a provision that Russia would arbi-
trate in case of disagreements about the implementation of the terms of the alliance.17
However, the Bulgarian vision of the rapprochement won out and resulted in two 
treaties signed on 12 April (30 March) 1904. The first one was confidential—it estab-
lished a military alliance, guaranteed support for the project of reforms in Macedonia 
and for attempts to expand it to Thrace, and declared counteracting attempts to oc-
cupy provinces of Turkey-in-Europe by the Great Powers. Out of the Serbian propos-
als, the mechanism of Russian arbitration on contentious matters was maintained, 
as were efforts to secure Montenegrin influence on Albanian territories.18 The other, 
publicised treaty focused on economic cooperation and working towards a customs 
16  “Забелешке Николе Пашића о разговорима са бугарским отправником послова пуковника 
Хесапчијевим, Београд 11/23.02 – 19.02/3.03.1904, бр. 540” [in:] Документи о спољној политици 
Краљевине Србије 1903–1914, књ. 1, св. 1, прип. А. Раденић, ур. Р. Самарџић, Београд 1991, pp. 
984–990; Е. Стателова, Р. Попов, В. Танкова, История на българската дипломация 1879–1913 
г., София 1994, pp. 327–330; С. Радоева, Димитър Ризов – от Битоля до Берлин (1862–1918), 
pp. 128–130.
17  От полковник Хасапчиев до Рачо Петров, Белград 11.0.3.1904, НБКМ-БИА, ф. 266 а.е. 25 
л. 51–57; Е. Стателова, Р. Попов,  В. Танкова, История на българската дипломация 1879–1913 
г., pp. 332–336; Б. Поповић, Дипломатска историја Србије, Београд 2010, pp. 495–496.
18  “Układ serbsko-bułgarski [zawarty w Belgradzie 30 marca / 12 kwietnia 1904]” [in:] Historia 
Bułgarii 1870–1915. Materiały źródłowe z komentarzami, vol. 1: Polityka międzynarodowa, eds. 
J. Rubacha, A. Malinowski , A. Giza, Warszawa 2006, pp. 81–82.
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union.19 The fact that the confidential document contained no description of spheres 
of influence should be regarded as a result of the tenacity of the Bulgarian side, which 
in this way did not want to recognise any part of the Macedonian territory as Serbian. 
The treaties were ratified by both parliaments on 12 May (29 April) 1904, and three 
days later a meeting was held between Prince Ferdinand I and King Peter I in Niš. All 
signs pointed to the Serbian-Bulgarian rapprochement becoming reality.20
The second half of 1904 brought about disappointment. In June, the efforts to 
include Montenegro in the project failed, and the Bulgarians blamed the Serbs for 
this, as the source of a leak which influenced Prince Nicholas to turn his back on the 
initiative.21 The government in Cetinje was also in conflict with Belgrade over Mon-
tenegrin migration to Serbia and the support shown by the Serbian government to the 
constitutional opposition in Cetinje. Although on 11 October (28 September) a Bul-
garian-Serbian military convention was held, which was approved by both sides, in 
the end it was not enforced. The new government in Belgrade, in which in December 
1904 Sava Grujić was replaced by Nikola Pašić, who was much more stubborn about 
Macedonian issues, refused to sign it. The end of 1904 passed in an atmosphere of 
colder Bulgarian-Serbian relations and the dismissal of the idea of a South Slavic 
alliance.22 In the following year, both sides returned to the starting point—1905 saw 
more Serbian activity in Macedonia and clashes between Bulgarian and Serbian che-
tas, which was the clearest sign that the alliance had failed.23
The following years showed that the project of the South Slavic alliance was 
built on very fragile foundations. In March 1907, a rumour started among diplomats 
that an attempt was being made to form a Balkan alliance (with the participation of 
Serbia, Montenegro, and Turkey) against Bulgaria. The rumour was quickly quashed, 
but the situation proved that there was tension among South-Slavic states.24 The Brit-
ish consul in Belgrade had a confidential conversation with Dimitar Rizov, who noted 
a clear impasse in relations with Serbia due to the rapprochement between Bulgaria 
and Austria-Hungary and the activities of Serbian chetas in Macedonia. Rizov, who 
had been one of the biggest enthusiasts of the 1904 treaties, admitted that he was 
19  “Дружествен договор между Княжество България и Кралство Сърбия, Белград 30.03.1904” 
[in:] Сръбските интриги и коварства срещу България (1804–1914). Дипломатически документи, 
съст. Ц. Билярски, София 2009, pp. 192–193.
20  “Телеграма от княз Фердинанд до българския дипломатически агент в Сърбия, София 
[април 1904]” [in:] Сръбските интриги, pp. 196–197; Б. Боев, “Посещението на Сръбски крал 
и сръбско-българското сближение,” Списание на Българското икономическо дружество 1904, 
год. 8, кн. 1, p. 660.
21  Писмо от Българско дипломатическо агенство в Цетиние до Министерство на вънчните 
дела и изповеданията, Цетиние 18.06.1904, НБКМ-БИА, ф. 266 а.е. 25 л. 42а–45a.
22  К. Списаревски, Сръбско-българския митнически съюз: Принос към историята 
на сръбско-българското побратимяване, София 1906, pp. 29–30; Е. Стателова, Р. Попов, 
В. Танкова, История на българската дипломация 1879–1913 г., pp. 340–344; J. Rubacha, Bułgarski 
sen o Bizancjum. Polityka Bułgarii w latach 1878–1913, Warszawa 2004, s. 113.
23  ЦДА, ф. 331к оп. 1 а.е. 144, passim.
24  FO 371/202/288–316.
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considering his resignation from the position of the diplomatic agent in Belgrade, 
recognising the failure of his policy.25
While the rapprochement between Bulgaria and Serbia did not come to pass, some 
agreements survived in the economic sphere. In December 1904 the main provision 
of the second treaty of April (March) 1904, i.e. a customs union, was approved by the 
Serbian and Bulgarian National Assemblies. The union was to start on 14 (1) March 
1906 and to last for 11 years—it provided not only for lifting customs on borders but 
also for a number of regulations facilitating the functioning of Bulgarian companies 
in Serbia and vice versa. Article 16 provided for work on a common currency and 
a system of measures and weights, as well as cooperation on pursuing deserters, ex-
ecuting court sentences and extradition.26
The object of the treaty was, first of all, to make Serbia independent from trade 
exchange with Austria-Hungary (80–88% of exports in the early 20th C.), and Bul-
garia from Turkey (around 20% at that time), as a result of transit of Serbian goods 
via Bulgarian ports in the Black Sea region (Varna, Burgas). The talks were being 
conducted in secret from the government in Vienna, but this did not last very long. 
Austria-Hungary decisively demanded that Serbia withdraw from the customs union 
on the pretext that it conflicted with the Serbian-Austrian-Hungarian trade agree-
ment. The government in Belgrade refused, which led to Vienna’s embargo on Ser-
bian goods—the main Serbian exports, i.e. pigs, were stopped on the border for sani-
tary reasons. The position of Sofia seemed to be closer to Austria-Hungary in this 
conflict. Serbia, which felt insufficiently backed up by Bulgaria and concluded that 
it needed a much stronger supporter in the trade rivalry with Vienna, withdrew from 
the planned customs union. Initially, the government in Belgrade assumed that the 
customs war would end in exchange for Serbia abandoning the project. This was 
not the case. Serbian transit found its way via Turkey (Thessaloniki) and Romania 
(Brăila), and France replaced Austria-Hungary, both in terms of a ready market and 
a source of investment, loans, and weapon exports. This met with great disappoint-
ment of the government in Sofia, and the Bulgarian-Serbian relations became much 
colder again.27 This state continued until Bulgarian-Serbian negotiations regarding 
economic cooperation were revisited after Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Her-
zegovina in 1909; the talks resulted e.g. in an agreement on the liquidation of Serbian 
schools in Macedonia.28 This rapprochement was one of the steps towards the Balkan 
alliance created in 1912.
25  Mr Whitehouse to Sir Edward Grey, Belgrade 4.03.1907, FO 371/202/306.
26  К. Списаревски, Сръбско-българския митнически съюз, pp. 51–61.
27  Ibid., pp. 32–39; W. Felczak, T. Wasi lewski , Historia Jugosławii, Wrocław 1985, pp. 392–
393.
28  ЦДА ф. 331к оп. 1 а.е. 293, passim.
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SOUTH SLAVIC HOPE
Federalist concepts in the Balkans were at that time supported not only by South 
Slavic governments, but also by grassroots initiatives. In 1904 the students of the 
University of Sofia, led by the later writer and ethnologist Stiliyan Chilingirov, be-
came very active in this area. Between 6 and 8 March (22–24 February) 1904, the 
Student Balkan Congress was organised in Sofia, which gathered together representa-
tives of South Slavic nations: the Bulgarians, Serbs, Montenegrins, and Croats. The 
Greeks and Romanians, who had also been invited, did not reply to the invitation. 
As a result, the event took on a South Slavic character. The speeches given by the 
participants orbited around slogans of abandoning nationalisms and working towards 
a Balkan federation or confederation. The congress was attended, among others, by 
the later dictator of Bulgaria, Aleksandar Tsankov, and Boncho Boev. On 6 May (23 
April), St. George’s day, which was also the 100th anniversary of the coronation of 
King Peter I Karađorđević, the second congress was organised, this time in Belgrade. 
The Serbs from the Slavic South Organisation took over the initiative; they postu-
lated a union of the Serbs, Croats, Slovenians, and Bulgarians. During the congress, 
whose slogan was “South Slavs—unite!”, various scenarios of building South Slavic 
State were discussed. On the one hand, there were voices calling for a union under the 
rule of King Peter I, which referred back to the projects from the 1860s. On the other 
hand, many students believed that building a unified state had to be accompanied 
by overturning the monarchy and proclaiming a republic. The third Student Balkan 
Congress also took place in 1904 in Belgrade, but when the Bulgarian-Serbian talks 
ended in a fiasco, the initiative lost its significance.29
During the first Student Balkan Congress, one of the main speakers was Boncho 
Boev, and his two speeches were published in the Journal of the Bulgarian Economic 
Society, of which he was the editor, in 1904: The Visit of the King of Serbia and 
the Serbian-Bulgarian Rapprochement (Посещението на Сръбски крал и сръбско-
българското сближение) and The Balkan Federation as an Ideal of the Bulgar-
ian-Serb Youth (Балканската федерация като идеал на сръбско-българската 
младеж). The texts reflect Boev’s federalist views, which during this period, due to 
the Bulgarian-Serbian rapprochement, emphasised the prospects of a South Slavic 
union.
The starting point for Boncho Boev’s reflections was the conviction that the pe-
riod of 25 years after the Berlin Congress had been wasted in terms of achieving the 
main national goals by South Slavic states: the liberation from the Turkish rule of all 
Bulgarians and Serbs, i.e. the territories of Macedonia, Thrace, and Kosovo. Bulgaria 
and Serbia were unable to take advantage of the historical moments; they were po-
litically and militarily too weak “with their empty arsenals and small arms budgets, 
29  Б. Боев, “Балканската федерация като идеал на сръбско-българската младеж,” Списание на 
Българското икономическо дружество 1904, год. 8, кн. 2, p. 101; И. Орманджиев, Федерация на 
балканските народи, pp. 99–101; К. Манчев, Сърбия и сръбско-българските отношения 1804–
2010, София 2014, p. 206.
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prepared just to appease the general public who cannot even read numbers”.30 Boev 
reproached Bulgaria for spending 600 million leva since the rebirth of the state, and 
Serbia for spending 400 million, which in no way translated into military or political 
potential. By focusing on mutual conflicts (both internal and external), the govern-
ments in Sofia and Belgrade caused a situation where other states started to play the 
key role in Macedonia and Kosovo.31 Boev was naturally referring to the signatories 
of the Mürzsteg programme of 1903, which proposed that representatives of Austria-
Hungary, Russia, Italy, Great Britain, and France would, through their civil agents, 
oversee the Macedonian reform of the local gendarmerie, finances, judiciary, and 
administration.32
Boev had an even worse opinion about the economic achievements of the two 
largest South Slavic states. Every year, the budgets ended in deficit, public debt con-
tinued to grow, the industry practically did not exist, the only exports were fruits in 
Bulgaria’s case and pigs in Serbia’s, and the neighbouring countries, Austria-Hunga-
ry and Turkey, profited from the trade exchange. The Serbs were fully economically 
dependent on its northern neighbour, “losing its economic face in the sea of Habsburg 
economy”. Swine and plums, the two most important Serbian exports, were sold in 
Hungary, and then distributed in the world under a Hungarian label. Serbian cereal 
was ground in Hungarian mills and the bread baked with it was sold in the West. Ser-
bia was not an exception in South-Eastern Europe. Only 12% of the trade exchange 
in the region took place among Balkan states; the majority of the transactions were 
made with Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Great Britain. From Europe, South Slavs 
imported textiles, metals and metal products, colonial goods, leather and leather-
ware, chemical products, glass, and machinery, while the export was mainly limited 
to unprocessed foods and livestock.33 In short: Serbia and Bulgaria sold very cheap 
raw materials, which were processed by the Great Powers and sold for a much higher 
price, while also paying a fortune for Western products produced from materials im-
ported from the Balkans. Boev noted the particular cunning of the government in Vi-
enna, which kept strengthening the Serbs’ conviction that there was no alternative to 
the everlasting protection of the Habsburg monarchy. He blamed Austria-Hungary for 
provoking conflicts between Serbia and the Ottoman Empire (so that trade could not 
be directed through the port in Thessaloniki) as well as Bulgaria (which also had the 
consequence of limiting Belgrade’s role as Piedmont of the South Slavs). Boev called 
these disputes “small affairs” (appointing diplomatic agents and vladykas, opening 
schools and Orthodox churches in Macedonia), which in his opinion were instigated 
by the Great Powers to maintain the status quo in the region. European capitals had 
a vested interest in keeping the Balkans economically broken up because they earned 
millions from trading with the states in the region.34 The Bulgarian economist also 
30  Б. Боев, Посещението на Сръбски крал, p. 656.
31  Ibid., pp. 656–657.
32  See N. Akhund,  “Stabilizing a Crisis and the Mürzsteg Agreement of 1903. International Efforts 
to Bring Peace to Macedonia,” Hungarian Historical Review 2014, no. 3, pp. 587–608.
33  Б. Боев, Балканската федерация, pp. 109–110.
34  Ibid., p. 106.
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saw the roots of South Slavs’ economic weakness in education: Bulgarian and Ser-
bian schools did not prepare people for functioning on the labour market in the early 
20th C., and sent out “a host of undereducated clerks, philosophers, philologists, law-
yers, and economists”, which increased the malfunction of South Slavic economies.35
Although Boncho Boev devoted a lot of space to criticising the situation in the 
Balkans at the time, he also equally focused on how to change it to the advantage of 
the South Slavs. The first step was to be Serbia’s economic emancipation; this could 
be achieved in cooperation with Bulgaria, which offered railway transport and Black 
Sea ports, “which would be a window on the world for products from Serbia”. Boev 
calculated that 6,000–7,000 freight cars with Serbian exports could arrive in Varna 
and Burgas annually.36 In a longer term, the economic integration of the two South 
Slavic states would lead to creating an influential economic territory and achiev-
ing the status of an important entity, independent from foreign capital and with its 
own investment funds. Just as individual cities or provinces did not have the suitable 
capital to make the necessary investments in this area, neither did small states. Small 
economic entities equalled to Boev with small financial resources and insufficient 
capabilities in the field of economy. The economy of a united economic territory 
was to be based on producing livestock and foodstuffs by the Serbs and textiles and 
clothes by the Bulgarians. With time, as the federation would grow to include other 
Balkan states, these would also include growing vegetables and producing olive oil 
by the Greeks and involving the other Balkan nations (the Romanians in the first 
place) in exporting and trading these goods. As Boev wrote: “The diversity of the 
great territories, and in consequence, the wealth of raw materials, including the ones 
harvested in the mountains, is the Balkans’ asset, and an area for agreement between 
Balkan nations”.37
The economic union and creating a common market were supposed to become, in 
a longer term, the basis for a political and national union.38 Boev emphasised many 
times that the foundation of cooperation between the Serbs and the Bulgarians was 
the fact that these were “two fraternal nations living in identical cultural and eco-
nomic conditions, and two comparably small states should protect each other against 
larger ones”.39 The Bulgarian economist believed that “the union of the two largest 
South Slavic elements could take place without pathos and great diplomatic declara-
tions, because common economic interests are the most stable foundation for creating 
alliances”.40 Boev was aware that there were separate national cultures, the Serbian 
and the Bulgarian one, but he believed that this was secondary to the economic ben-
efits that the establishment of one state could bring.41 The South Slavs could emulate 
states such as Switzerland, Great Britain or Belgium, which had never been ethni-
35  Б. Боев, Посещението на Сръбски крал, pp. 657–658.
36  Ibid., pp. 660–661.
37  Б. Боев, Балканската федерация, p. 106.
38  Ibid., pp. 104–106; Б. Боев, Посещението на Сръбски крал, pp. 658–659.
39  Б. Боев, Посещението на Сръбски крал, p. 656.
40  Ibid., p. 661.
41  Б. Боев, Балканската федерация, pp. 102–103.
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cally homogeneous but over time created one nation. He emphasised that Bulgaria 
and Serbia were basically on the same level of development: at the stage of transfer-
ring from an agriculture-based economy to an industry-based economy; they also had 
a similar level of sales. Somewhat in the spirit of Marxism, he noted that classes and 
representatives of the same occupation among South Slavic nations could be closer 
to each other than representatives of one nation, divided socially and economically.42 
Boev did not hide that his inspiration was derived from leftist ideas—he emphasised 
that the next stage of the development of the federation would be the collapse of mon-
archs, who focused solely on warfare. Then, he anticipated the development of “state 
socialism” (clearly stating that he did not mean pure socialism), based on the model 
of a welfare and protectionist state with a broad labour market and a modern admin-
istration—a state which would guarantee the development of civil liberties and equal 
rights and reject “reactionist chauvinism”43. It may be surprising that these words 
were written by a thoroughbred capitalist, but we should remember about the context 
in which these texts were created; they were addressed to leftist student circles.
Boev had no illusions that the main source of conflict between the Serbs and the 
Bulgarians was the Macedonian question. He emphasised that the disagreement ex-
isted only in the heads of politicians on both sides, and the ordinary Serbs and Bulgar-
ians completely failed to understand it. The economist noted with disappointment that 
so far, no decisive supporter of the idea of federalism had appeared on the Bulgarian 
political scene. Boev wrote about the Bulgarian-Serbian conflict as a millennium-
long curse, the lifting of which was a great challenge for the contemporary people: 
“We have wasted 25 years attempting to achieve our goals, acting not in the spirit of 
a real policy but in the spirit of ideas formulated by enthusiasts of Dušan and Sam-
uil and other dreamers about kingdoms and empires”.44 He believed that the union 
would lead to neutralising the Macedonian antagonism, because it would mean that 
Sofia and Belgrade would join forces to attach this area to the common South Slavic 
state. The Bulgarian economist did not go into detail either with regard to the way of 
controlling the territories which remained under the Ottoman rule, or the political or-
ganisation of the state and Macedonia’s place in it, believing that these were matters 
secondary to the economic ones.45 He did, however, outline the borders of the South 
Slavic federation surrounded by three seas (the Black, Aegean, and Adriatic Seas), 
which functioned in peaceful conditions and respected the idea of pacifism. Economy 
again came to the forefront. Controlling the western, eastern and southern coasts of 
the Balkans would mean for the South Slavic state access to the cheapest means of 
transporting goods, as well as European and African trade routes. The vision of peace 
is equal to Boev with freeing up the funds so far designated to keeping an army; he 
noted that 100 million leva was spent annually on this area by Bulgaria and Serbia. 
42  Ibid., pp. 106–107.
43  Ibid., pp. 111–113.
44  Boev is referring to the medieval rulers, Serbian emperor Stefan Dušan and Bulgarian emperor 
Samuil – symbols of the Greater Serbia and Greater Bulgaria ideals. Б. Боев, Посещението на Сръбски 
крал, pp. 658–660.
45  Ibid., p. 661; Б. Боев, Балканската федерация, pp. 101–102.
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The economist saw the union as a prospect of saving half of this sum each year, and at 
the same time shifting 50,000 soldiers to farm and factory work, which— according 
to his estimates—would bring in an additional 15–20 million leva annually.46
In Boncho Boev’s concepts the South Slavic union was just a stage in the process 
of creating a supra-national Balkan federation with the participation of “the Turks, 
Greeks, and Bulgarians, the Vlachs and the Serbs, the Albanians, Koutsovlachs and 
Macedonians, followers of Exarchate and Patriarchate, Catholics, Uniats and Prot-
estants, the oppressed and the free”.47 The Bulgarian economist noted that this idea 
had been realised in the past—the Balkans had been united under the Turkish rule 
for five centuries. However, he believed the model of unity based on conquest and 
violence to be impermanent; true stability could be built on “common material and 
spiritual interests”. He thought that the Balkan union was inevitable; however, as he 
emphasised, it could take place either by means of a new yoke, under the Austrian or 
Russian rule, or by means of an independent federation.48 “Only when Bulgaria will 
sink in the Russian sea, and Serbian Sava will be decorated with St. Stephen’s crown, 
will we wake up. This is our joint task, to realise that we have one common interest,” 
warned Boev.49
CONCLUSION
Boev’s concepts were naive in many places—he did not see that both the differ-
ences between the Serbians and the Bulgarians and the conflict over Macedonia were 
so large that it was very unlikely to find South Slavic agreement in the form he pro-
posed. This was perfectly illustrated by the negotiations carried out in 1904 between 
Sofia and Belgrade: even signing specific contracts on a defence alliance and customs 
union, in which both states made some concessions, did not lead to removing these 
animosities. The Serbs continued to want to divide spheres of influence in Macedonia 
and fight against Austria-Hungary, and the Bulgarians continued to treat Macedonia 
as a uniform territory inhabited by the Bulgarians and saw Vienna as a potential ally. 
Boev overestimated the key role of economy in the potential union, naively believ-
ing that a Serb and a Bulgarian with a full stomach would forget about great national 
ambitions: Stefan Dušan and San Stefano. Contrary to what the Bulgarian economist 
assumed, not only politicians, but both societies were involved in the dispute and 
supported the activities of their respective governments. Boev focused too much on 
describing current economic problems and the economic benefits which would come 
from a unified South Slavic state (over time expanded to the other Balkan states), but 
he did not address a number of questions which were much more important at that 
46  Б. Боев, Балканската федерация, p. 110.
47  Ibid., p. 103.
48  Ibid.
49  Ibid., pp. 110–111.
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time. How to bring about including Macedonia in the planned federation: through 
war, an insurrection, a union modelled on East Rumelia in 1885? How to politically 
organise the new Bulgarian-Serbian, and then Bulgarian-Serbian-Macedonian, state? 
How to guarantee the equal status of all the states in the federation? How to solve the 
dispute about the nationality of the Macedonian Slavs? Boev did not even try to ad-
dress these difficult questions. The attempts to form a Bulgarian-Serbian alliance in 
1904 were based on similarly weak foundations; the initiative of the Student Balkan 
Congresses turned out to be even shorter-lived. These problems also surfaced during 
the functioning of the Balkan League in 1912, and they caused what we could call 
a fraternal war among the allies a year later.
Nevertheless, in the times when the “Balkan powder keg” more and more fre-
quently threatened to explode, everything seemed to be leading to a conflict, and the 
fraternal Balkan nations burnt with more and more hatred towards one another, the 
voice of Boncho Boev, calling for unity in order to avoid the catastrophe of fraternal 
wars, was a valuable one. We also cannot deny the logic of the Bulgarian economist’s 
reasoning, which is best illustrated by the modern times. The process of political uni-
fication preceded by economic integration, proposed by Boev, is being implemented 
in a different form in the present-day European Union.
In comparison to Serbian intellectuals and politicians, in Bulgaria the ideas of 
South Slavic cooperation were on the margins of political thought. Proclaimed also 
by socialists, the milieu of the insignificant Radical Democratic Party, and some ac-
tivists of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO), they did not 
emphasise the South Slavic element, and instead proposed organising the Balkans in 
the form of a federation, with the participation of non-Slavic nations inhabiting the 
region (the Greeks, Romanians, and Turks). This is also visible in Boncho Boev’s 
thought, for whom the South Slavic state was only a temporary stage. The domination 
of the idea of Balkan federalism over Yugoslavism and the virtual replacement of the 
latter in the Bulgarian political thought was not only the result of the conflict with 
the Serbs, which had been gathering speed since 1878. Already in the first half of the 
19th C. the geographical distance from the other South Slavs, the initial fears of be-
ing absorbed by the more advanced Serbian national movement, and closer contacts 
with Russia than with the Serbs, Croats and Slovenians pushed the Bulgarians to the 
margin of Illyrian concepts, which later evolved into Yugoslavism.50
50  Н. Кайчев,  Илирия от Варна до Вилах. Хърватското национално възраждане, сърбите 
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